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This paper reports two studies concerning impression management, impres- 
sion formation, and feedback-seeking. Study 1 demonstrated that people seek 
less feedback when being observed and respond to situational norms regarding 
the appropriate frequency of seeking. However, Study 2 showed that when an 
individual has a superior performance history, seeking enhances observers’ 
impressions of the seeker’s personal characteristics and performance potential 
in the organization. The implications of these findings for feedback-seeking 
and the provision of feedback in organizations are discussed. 0 1992 Academic 
press, Inc. 
Feedback research typically exhorts supervisors to provide feedback 
frequently (cf. Ilgen, Fisher 8z Taylor, 1979; Larson, 1984). Indeed, given 
that feedback can be an invaluable aid in correcting misguided work be- 
haviors (Vroom, 1964; Erez, 1977), it would be desirable if feedback 
flowed freely in organizations. In actuality, however, the flow of feedback 
in organizations typically is somewhat constrained. Superiors seldom for- 
mally review performance more than once a year and individuals at all 
levels are reluctant to give feedback informally (Blumberg, 1972; 
Schoeneman, 1981). These constraints on the flow of feedback might be 
less costly if employees felt free to seek feedback on their own when they 
wanted or needed it. However, while the act of seeking may reflect an 
employee’s concern with being an effective performer, Ashford and Cum- 
mings (1983) have suggested that employees may not initiate overt feed- 
back-seeking (i.e., directly ask others for feedback using an inquiry strat- 
egy) because of the perceived impression-management costs associated 
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with feedback search. Organizations are made up of people who observe 
and make judgments about each other. If people believe that feedback- 
seeking conveys a negative impression of the seeker-for instance, that 
the seeker is insecure, uncertain, or incompetent-they will be less likely 
to seek. This paper presents two studies examining the role of impression- 
management dynamics in feedback-seeking. Study 1 tests whether per- 
ceived impression-management costs influence an individual’s decision to 
seek feedback. Study 2 examines the other side of the impression- 
management issue: Do observers use an individual’s feedback-seeking as 
a cue in impression formation? 
Study 1 
Impression management is a central psychological issue in the perfor- 
mance appraisal process. Supervisors control employees’ access to im- 
portant rewards such as pay raises and promotions. For employees, 
therefore, their supervisor’s impressions of them are critical. Researchers 
have documented not only the tactics individuals use to gain a higher 
initial performance evaluation, such as setting higher public goals (Ferris 
& Porac, 1984) or providing excuses and apologies for poor performance 
(Eagly &z Acksen, 1971; Wood & Mitchell, 1981), and also the tactics 
undertaken to repair one’s image after receiving a negative evaluation 
(Eagly, 1967; Schneider, 1969). While there are many things employees 
can do to promote a positive image or repair a temporarily damaged 
image, there are also behaviors that employees may explicitly want to 
avoid doing to prevent a negative impression (e.g., asking lots of ques- 
tions or smoking excessively). Arkin (1981) includes these tactics under 
the motive: protective self-presentation. 
Clearly there are both potential impression-management gains and 
costs that must be managed in the performance appraisal process. While 
recent research has emphasized how people can use feedback-seeking for 
impression-management gains (Wolfe & Bies, 1989), the current research 
tests Ashford and Cummings’ (1983) hypotheses regarding the impres- 
sion-management costs of seeking. Impression-management costs are in- 
curred when taking an action (such as seeking feedback) detracts from an 
individual’s desired social image or identity (Tetlock & Manstead, 1985). 
Ashford and Cummings (1983) suggested that, other things being equal, 
individuals will be less likely to seek feedback when others can observe 
them doing so because seeking feedback exposes their need for this in- 
formation. This need for feedback could be interpreted as a sign of weak- 
ness, uncertainty, or lack of self-confidence. Therefore, in order to main- 
tain a confident self-image, individuals may curb their seeking when an 
audience is present. 
The current study also varied the evaluative intent of the audience. 
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Arkin (1981, p. 317) has argued that audience characteristics should affect 
actors’ subjective probabilities of disapproval and subsequent loss, and 
therefore their impression-management motives. Arkin (1981) notes, 
though, that there is little empirical evidence to substantiate this claim. 
The presence of audiences that are explicitly evaluating the subject 
should increase protective self-presentation motives (and decrease feed- 
back-seeking) relative to audiences without an explicitly evaluative in- 
tent. Thus Hypothesis 1 suggests that the evaluative context of seeking 
will significantly infhtence the frequency of feedback seeking. Individuals 
will seek less feedback when their seeking is public than when it is pri- 
vate, and will seek the least feedback when their public seeking is ob- 
served by an evaluative (rather than nonevaluative) audience. Thus: 
H,,: Individuals will seek less feedback when others can observe their requests for 
feedback. They will seek even less feedback if observers are acting in an explicitly 
evaluative capacity. 
In an initial test of this hypothesis, Northcraft and Ashford (1990) found 
only marginally significant reductions in feedback-seeking when audi- 
ences were present. However, their results could be attributed to the 
manipulation of public seeking in their study (requiring subjects to turn in 
a colored card in the company of other performers). This manipulation 
may not have been sufficiently vivid for subjects to see it as exposing 
important information about themselves. Further, their task (stock port- 
folio management) was unfamiliar to subjects and thus may not have 
elicited impression-management concerns. It may not have mattered to 
subjects that seeking revealed their uncertainty because the task was 
unfamiliar and not central to their self-concepts. The current study pro- 
vided a more appropriate test of this hypothesis. The public seeking ma- 
nipulation was more vivid and the experimental task tapped characteris- 
tics relevant to all subjects-e.g., how well individuals relate to people 
and individuals’ judgments about situations. 
Ashford and Cummings (1983) have argued that individuals curtail feed- 
back search when an audience is present because they perceive risks in 
seeking and feel anxious in light of those risks. Arkin’s (1981) notion of 
protective self-presentation motive is consistent with this argument. 
While Northcraft and Ashford (1990) also hypothesized an impression- 
management motive in reduced seeking, they did not examine the inter- 
vening psychological states hypothesized by Ashford and Cummings 
(1983). Rather, Northcraft and Ashford (1990) simply examined the end 
result-the amount of seeking in private as opposed to public contexts. 
This study extends Northcraft and Ashford’s previous work by directly 
measuring the intervening psychological states hypothesized to underlie 
reduced feedback-seeking in public contexts. Thus: 
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Hr,,: When feedback must be sought in the presence of an audience, decreased 
feedback-seeking will be accompanied by: (1) more nervousness about seeking 
feedback and (2) more anxiety about the task. 
Norms about the appropriate frequency of feedback-seeking should 
also affect feedback search. A primary motive for feedback-seeking in 
organizations is that people are uncertain how to act and want to know 
what to do. Interestingly, one thing people may be uncertain of is how 
much feedback to seek. In uncertain situations, individuals frequently 
rely on social cues to suggest appropriate behavior (Festinger, 1954). In 
this way, social cues act much in the way that decision anchors do in more 
quantitative decision situations (e.g., Northcraft & Neale, 1986)-they 
serve as reference points that people use as a basis for generating their 
own behaviors. Norms for appropriate behavior are one form of social 
cue. If norms suggest that feedback-seeking is typically a frequent event, 
then regardless of the publicness or evaluativeness of the context indi- 
viduals should take this into account in deciding whether to seek. Thus: 
H,: Norms suggesting that feedback-seeking is a frequent occurrence should pro- 
mote subsequent feedback-seeking; norms suggesting that feedback-seeking is an 
infrequent occurrence should inhibit feedback-seeking. 
Norms regarding feedback search also may reduce the perceived im- 
pression-management costs of seeking feedback in a public context. In- 
dividuals assess impression-management costs by attempting to infer how 
others may see their behaviors (Schneider, 1981). Individuals may feel 
that frequent feedback-seeking will not be judged negatively in contexts 
where it is normatively sanctioned to frequently seek feedback. Attribu- 
tion theory (Kelley, 1967) suggests that in order to draw inferences re- 
garding another person, observers assess the consistency of behaviors 
across situations, across time, and across people. Behaviors peculiar to 
any particular individual will be seen as diagnostic of that individual’s 
character. If frequent feedback-seeking is the norm, then any individual’s 
seeking does not reveal anything distinctive about that individual to oth- 
ers observing the behavior. Therefore, feedback-seekers may feel that the 
impression-management costs of feedback-seeking are reduced when fre- 
quent feedback-seeking is the norm. A frequent feedback-seeking norm 
should then “release” individuals from the usual impression-management 
costs of feedback-seeking. This argument suggests the following interac- 
tion between norms and audience effects: 
H,: The presence of an audience will inhibit feedback-seeking unless there is a 
“frequent feedback-seeking” norm. 
Finally, while all individuals respond to perceived impression- 
management costs to some extent, certain individuals are particularly 
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sensitive to the presence of an audience. These individuals ought to be 
particularly responsive to feedback-seeking concerns. An individual dif- 
ference variable, public self-consciousness, studied primarily in psychol- 
ogy, taps this heightened sensitivity to audiences. Public self- 
consciousness involves an awareness of the self as a social object (Fenig- 
stein, 1979, p 76). Publicly self-conscious individuals are susceptible to 
feelings of being observed when in the presence of others (Argyle & 
Williams, 1969; Fenigstein, Scheier & Buss, 1975), can usually infer how 
others perceive them, and are highly sensitive to how others react to them 
in social situations (Fenigstein, 1979). 
Their heightened awareness of the self as a social object should make 
publicly self-conscious individuals more responsive to the demands of 
their social situations. If Ashford and Cummings (1983) are correct that 
public feedback-seeking carries impression-management costs, then these 
individuals should be more aware of these costs than will individuals low 
in public self-consciousness. This logic suggests that: 
H,,: Individuals high in public self-consciousness will reduce feedback-seeking to a 
greater extent than will individuals low in public self-consciousness when seeking 
must be done in the presence of an audience. 
These hypotheses were tested by examining subjects’ performance on 
an “in-basket” exercise. The study did not attempt to replicate any real- 
world setting. Rather, the context in which subjects completed this in 
basket was designed to recreate the psychological experiences thought to 
be relevant to feedback-seeking and to isolate those variables suggested 
by Ashford and Cummings (1983) and the preceding hypotheses as pri- 
mary determinants of feedback-seeking behavior. 
Method 
Subjects. Sixty-seven undergraduate psychology students (38 male, 29 
female) at a northeastern college participated in partial fulfillment of a 
course requirement. Subjects were randomly assigned to experimental 
conditions. 
Design overview. Subjects participated in a computerized in-basket 
task designed by Sandelands and Calder (1987) and adapted for this study. 
Subjects were instructed to assume the role of manager in the XYZ Corp. 
Each subject had 30 min to read and respond to 10 offtce memoranda on 
a variety of topics. Each memorandum was one or two computer screens 
in length and formatted to resemble an actual office memorandum. When 
the subject finished reading a memorandum, the computer presented a set 
of possible responses to the memorandum (from four to eight responses 
per memo; %! = 5) and the subject chose one from among the offered 
alternatives. Following selection of a response, the subject could go on to 
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the next memorandum or request feedback on the appropriateness of the 
selected response. If a subject requested feedback, the computer dis- 
played a narrative feedback paragraph discussing the implications of each 
of the possible responses for that memo. This paragraph was the same 
regardless of which response the subject had chosen. The feedback para- 
graphs were constructed to be factual and neutral in tone. 
Though the task of being a “manager” was unfamiliar to subjects, the 
component activities of this task-making judgments about people and 
situations and taking actions that will not alienate people-were thought 
to be highly relevant to these subjects’ self-concepts. Seven of the 10 
memos asked for the manager’s judgment about employees or about ac- 
tions that would affect employees; the other three concerned operations 
decisions. The process of deciding how to deal with the interpersonal 
situations faced by this fictitious manager is argued to be both more 
familiar to these subjects and more personally involving than were the 
stock buy-and-sell decisions made by Northcraft and Ashford’s (1989) 
subjects. 
The context in which the in-basket was completed varied across sub- 
jects based on a fully crossed 3 by 3 (Seeking Context by Norms) factorial 
design. The first independent variable was the Seeking Context in which 
the in-basket exercise was performed. There were three conditions: Pub- 
lic-Evaluative, Public-Nonevaluative, and Private. Under the Public con- 
ditions, while completing the in-basket exercise, the subject was seated in 
front of a desk-top computer in a large classroom. Two “observers” were 
seated on either side of the subject, about 10 ft away. Under the Public- 
Evaluative condition, subjects were told that the observers were there to 
evaluate them-to determine the kind of person they were from observing 
the way that they went about the task. Under the Public-Nonevaluative 
condition subjects were told that the observers were explicitly nof eval- 
uating them. To make it plausible to subjects that the observer could 
actually see their work, everything which appeared on the subject’s com- 
puter screen also appeared on a large rear-projection screen (approxi- 
mately 10 ft x 10 ft) behind the subject except the contents of any feed- 
back requested by the subject. Requested feedback was printed on a 
desk-top printer for the subject’s access only. The rear-projection screen 
was clearly visible to the subject and both observers. In the Private con- 
dition, the subject was seated in front of a desk-top computer, but in one 
cubicle of a multiple-cubicle computer lab. No other people were visible 
to the subject or could view the subject’s computer screen. Requested 
feedback was printed on the subject’s computer screen. 
The second independent variable was Norms. There were three condi- 
tions: High, Low, and No Norms. Norms were manipulated by sharing 
the alleged end-of-exercise feedback summary from a previous subject 
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prior to beginning the current subject’s in-basket exercise. Under the 
High Norm condition, the results summary revealed that the previous 
subject had requested feedback following 9 of the 10 in-basket items. 
Further, the subject was described by the experimenter as “pretty typi- 
cal,” and the results summary noted that the mean number of feedback 
requests by subjects to date was 8.8. In the Low Norm condition, the 
“typical subject” had requested feedback only once. This rate was also 
described as pretty typical, and the mean number of requests by subjects 
to date was noted to be 1.2. In the No Norm condition, the results sum- 
mary contained no information about the previous subject’s feedback 
requests. 
Subject’s self-consciousness was assessed using the Fenigstein et al., 
(1975) scale. This scale has been shown to have adequate reliability in 
several previous studies (cf. Fenigstein, 1979; Turner, Carver, Scheier, & 
Ickes, 1978). Alpha for this study was .80. 
Procedure. Subjects reported to a large classroom in order to partici- 
pate. Upon arrival, all subjects completed a “managerial readiness” pre- 
test questionnaire which contained the Public Self-consciousness Scale. 
Upon completion of the questionnaire, the in-basket exercise and the 
justification for the study were presented to the subject. It was explained 
that the researchers-both business school professors-often are called 
upon to counsel MBAs on their management skills. The in-basket was 
described as a computerized exercise designed to assist the professors in 
assessing students’ management skills. The subjects were told that the 
in-basket had been tried out with some practicing managers but not yet 
with students. 
It was further explained that the in-basket provided several manage- 
ment-potential evaluation opportunities. Under both Public Seeking Con- 
text conditions, subjects were told that two observers would be observing 
their behaviors. Under the Public-Evaluative condition, subjects were 
told that the observers would be attempting to discover the kind of person 
they were from observing the way that they went about the task. Subjects 
were shown a short questionnaire that observers would complete assess- 
ing several personal characteristics (such as self-confidence). Under the 
Public-Nonevaluative conditions, subjects were told that one observer 
was there to learn how to run the study and the other observer was there 
in case any technical (computer) problems occurred. In both Public con- 
ditions, it was pointed out that the observers also would see (via the 
overhead screen) everything that appeared on the subject’s computer but 
would not see any feedback messages solicited. 
Under all conditions, it was noted that the in-basket program could 
provide two forms of feedback to subjects: overall feedback (provided at 
the end of the exercise) and feedback about the appropriateness of re- 
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sponses to any of the 10 memos (provided by request only after each 
memo). The “previous subject’s overall feedback” (which comprised the 
Norms manipulation) was used to demonstrate the end-of-exercise feed- 
back. The end-of-exercise feedback consisted of two parts: (1) the Norm 
manipulation, i. e . , a summary of the previous subject’s feedback re- 
quests, and (2) some apparently evaluative information relating to the 
previous subject’s selected responses to the memos (e.g., “decision style 
= B3”). The apparently evaluative information gave no clues as to ap- 
propriate ways to tackle the task and was the same for all subjects. The 
subject was then led through a practice memo on the computer to show 
how the exercise worked and to demonstrate feedback available after 
each memo. The practice memo revealed that feedback, if requested, 
provided comments about the advantages and implications of each pos- 
sible forced-choice response to the memo. Subjects were informed that 
this after-memo feedback was based on the previous responses of a sam- 
ple of practicing managers and the expert knowledge of the two research- 
ers. 
After demonstrating the practice memo, the researcher told the subject 
to begin the exercise. Subjects went through the practice memo to prac- 
tice using the computer before starting the exercise. Subjects were told 
they had 30 min to complete all 10 memos. 
Following the completion of the tenth memo, each subject was asked to 
complete a short follow-up questionnaire. The questionnaire requested 
information about the task (e.g., “How difficult was the task?“) and 
about the subject (e.g., “How anxious were you during the task?,” “Dur- 
ing the experiment, did you feel nervous about asking for feedback?“). 
These follow-up questions provided single-item measures of the depen- 
dent and intervening variables, as well as the manipulation checks for the 
study. The computer also recorded the number of requests for feedback 
following the individual memos made by each subject. Following com- 
pletion of the follow-up questionnaire, subjects were debriefed and 
thanked for their participation. 
Results 
Manipulation checks. The manipulation checks confirmed the effec- 
tiveness of the experimental manipulations. First, 100% of subjects under 
the two Public Seeking Context conditions reported that they were being 
watched as they performed the task, versus 15% of subjects in the Private 
Seeking Context condition (x2 = 50.77, p < 0.01). Additionally, subjects 
under the Public-Evaluative Seeking Context condition were significantly 
more likely than subjects under the Public-Nonevaluative Seeking Con- 
text condition (84 versus 46% of subjects) to report that the observers 
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were evaluating their performance rather than the task (x2 = 6.26, p < 
.05). 
Second, subjects under the Low, High, and No Norm conditions re- 
ported appropriate beliefs about how often other subjects typically seek 
feedback in this task (means of 2.29, 8.00, and 5.56, respectively; all 
intercell ts > 4.22, ps < .Ol) and how often they thought a friend doing 
this task “should” seek feedback about his/her performance (means of 
3.33, 7.70, and 5.36, respectively; all intercell ts > 2.98, ps < .Ol). It is 
interesting to note that there was also a significant main effect for Seeking 
Context on both of these variables. Subjects’ beliefs about how frequently 
other subjects typically seek feedback were the lowest under the Public- 
Evaluative Seeking Context condition, second under the Public- 
Nonevaluative condition, and highest under the Private condition (means 
of 4.85, 5.07, and 6.15, respectively F(1,49) = 5.20, p < .05). Beliefs 
about how often a friend should seek feedback also demonstrated this 
pattern (means of 4.80, 5.13, and 6.46, respectively, F(1,48) = 6.06, p < 
.05). These findings provide additional support for the impact of the seek- 
ing context manipulation. 
The experimental groups did not significantly differ in their ratings of 
the usefulness of feedback they received (p > .82). The mean number of 
feedback requests for the total sample was 5.5 times out of 10 opportu- 
nities. 
Experimental hypotheses. The mean number of feedback requests by 
subjects (up to 10 requests possible) are displayed by Seeking Context 
and Norm conditions in Table 1. Table 2 presents results of an analysis of 
variance performed to test the experimental hypotheses using specific 
planned comparisons among treatment means. (For an explanation of this 
technique, see Winer, 1971, p 175.) 
A planned comparison capturing the expected relative levels of feed- 
back requests across Seeking Context conditions proposed in Hypothesis 
la was supported. Subjects sought less feedback in Public (4.30 requests) 
than in Private (6.5 requests) Seeking Contexts, and less feedback in 
TABLE 1 
MEAN REQUESTS FOR FEEDBACK-SEEKING CONTEXT CONDITION 
Norm 
condition 
Private 
Mean SD 
Public Public 
nonevaluative evaluative 
Mean SD Mean SD 
Row 
mean 
Lo 3.75 1.67 2.80 .84 1 so 1.41 2.67 
High 7.88 2.23 6.40 3.13 5.51 2.12 6.53 
No 7.60 2.41 5.20 3.83 3.95 3.13 5.81 
Column mean 6.50 4.80 3.80 
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TABLE 2 
ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE RESULTS-STUDY 1 
Source 
Total 
Explained 
Hl-seeking context 
H2-norms 
H3-norms x seeking context 
H4--public self-consciousness 
x seeking context 
Residual explained 
ss 
620.28 
340.30 
81.37 
163.88 
2.97 
9.82 1 9.82 1.72 ns 
82.26 13 6.32 1.11 ns 
- 
DF MS F P R2 
66 9.38 
17 20.02 3.50 .ooo 
1 81.37 14.24 .Ol 0.13 
1 163.88 28.68 .OOl 0.26 
1 2.91 0.52 ns 
Error 279.98 49 5.71 
Public-Evaluative (3.8 requests) than in Public-Nonevaluative (4.8 re- 
quests) Seeking Contexts (F(1,49) = 14.24, p < .Ol). 
Hypothesis 2 suggested that norms should affect feedback-seeking fre- 
quency. A planned comparison capturing the expected levels of feedback 
requests for the different norm conditions suggested by Hypothesis 2 was 
supported. Subjects under the Low Norm condition sought less feedback 
(2.67 requests), and subjects under the High Norm condition sought more 
feedback (6.53 requests) than did subjects in the No Norm condition (5.81 
requests; F(1,49) = 28.68, p < .OOl). 
Hypothesis lb proposed that Seeking Context would influence sub- 
jects’ psychological states and that these psychological states in turn 
would affect feedback seeking. Consistent with this hypothesis, a planned 
comparison for Seeking Context was significant for the dependent mea- 
sure “nervous about seeking feedback” (F(1,43) = 25.43, p < .OOl). 
Subjects reported being more nervous about seeking in Public than in 
Private seeking contexts, and more nervous about seeking in Public- 
Evaluative than in Public-Nonevaluative contexts. Subjects did not differ 
by Seeking Context in “anxiety about the task” (F < 2.0, ns). A parallel 
analysis revealed that subjects did not differ significantly by Norm con- 
dition in either nervousness or anxiety (Fs ==z 2.0, ns). 
Regression analysis was used to test whether these psychological states 
in fact mediated the effects of Seeking Context and Norms on feedback- 
seeking. The results of this analysis are shown in Table 3. First, (a) 
frequency of subjects’ feedback requests was regressed on Seeking Con- 
text and Norms. This provided support for the significant influence of 
Seeking Context and Norms noted in the tests of Hypotheses la and 2. 
Next, (b) frequency of subjects’ feedback requests was regressed on ner- 
vousness about seeking feedback and anxiety about the task only. Ner- 
vousness was significantly negatively related to subjects’ feedback re- 
quests (F = 14.27, p < .OOl); anxiety was marginally positively related to 
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TABLE 3 
TEST OF MEDIATING EFFECTS OF NERVOUSNESS AND ANXIETY ON 
FEEDBACK-SEEKING FREQUENCY 
Beta F P 
a Seeking context - .248 5.109 .027 
Norms .398 13.161 .ooo 
Adjusted R2 = .204 
b “Nervous about seeking” - .436 14.276 .003 
“Anxious about the task” .195 2.871 .095 
Adjusted R2 = .164 
c “Nervous about seeking” -.316 7.573 .008 
“Anxious about the task” .211 3.935 .052 
Seeking context -.165 2.191 ,144 
Norms .357 11.495 .OOl 
Adjusted R2 = .291 
subjects’ feedback requests (F = 2.87, p < .lO). Finally, (c) frequency of 
subjects’ feedback requests was regressed on Seeking Context and 
Norms, with Nervousness and Anxiety already in the regression equa- 
tion. With Nervousness and Anxiety in the equation, Seeking Context no 
longer was significantly related to subjects’ feedback requests (F = 2.19, 
p = .14); Norms remained significantly related to subjects’ feedback 
requests (F = 11.49, p < .002). These results support the contention that 
psychological states (at least, nervousness about seeking feedback) me- 
diate the significant effect of Seeking Context on frequency of feedback 
seeking. The effects of norms, on the other hand, are not significantly 
mediated by nervousness or anxiety. The norms finding is consistent with 
Hypothesis 2. 
Hypothesis 3 was not supported. The anticipated interaction between 
Seeking Context and Norms as tested by a third planned contrast was not 
significant (F < 2.0, ns). It appears that a frequent-seeking norm did not 
“release” subjects from the impression-management demands of a Public 
Seeking Context. Hypothesis 4 also was not supported. A moderated 
regression was performed to test the effect of the interaction of Public 
Self-consciousness and Seeking Context on seeking frequency over and 
above their main effects. The interaction did not significantly contribute 
to the prediction of feedback seeking frequency (AR2 = .Ol, p > . 10). It 
appears that high Public Self-consciousness subjects did not curtail their 
seeking to a greater extent in Public Seeking Contexts than did subjects 
low in Public Self-consciousness. 
Discussion 
The results of Study 1 suggest that people do consider impression- 
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management concerns when deciding whether to seek feedback. A seek- 
ing context that includes an audience, particularly an audience that a 
performer believes is attempting to discover the kind of person he or she 
is, creates nervousness about seeking feedback and significantly deters 
actual feedback-seeking. This finding corroborates Northcraft and Ash- 
ford’s (1990) previous findings and suggests a variable-the evaluative- 
ness of the seeking context-that may moderate the strength of impres- 
sion-management motives. In Northcraft and Ashford’s (1990) study, the 
seeking context consisted of coperformers (other subjects), while the au- 
dience in the current study consisted of observers attempting to discern 
the underlying character of the performer. The observers in this study 
were both more clearly focused on the performer and more explicitly 
evaluative than were Northcraft and Ashford’s (1990) coperformers, 
which could account for differences in manifested impression- 
management concerns. 
The findings regarding task anxiety as a mediating variable help rule out 
one possible alternative explanation for these findings. Specifically, the 
presence and evaluativeness of the audience did not affect general task 
anxiety which, in turn, was not significantly related to feedback-seeking. 
These findings make it more difficult to argue that individuals did not seek 
simply to get a stressful task over with more quickly. Individuals both did 
not feel more anxious about the task when performed in front of an 
audience (evaluative or not) and any anxiety felt did not deter seeking. In 
fact, experienced task anxiety was marginally positively related to seek- 
ing frequency. 
The results of this study also suggest that individuals use norms about 
typical feedback-seeking behavior as situational cues in making decisions 
about how frequently to seek. Subjects under the Low Norm condition 
sought significantly less feedback than did those under the No Norm 
condition, who in turn, sought less feedback than those under the High 
Norm condition. This finding complements DeWhirst’s (1971) field study 
results indicating that norms regarding the appropriateness of seeking 
information in general regulated actual information-seeking behavior. 
These two findings-audience and norm effects-have important im- 
plications for managers hoping to open up the feedback flow in organiza- 
tions. First, the inhibiting effect of an audience (particularly an explicitly 
evaluative one) suggests that feedback-seeking will be more constrained 
in organizations where assessments of an employee’s general character 
are informally collected from a variety of sources (e.g., peers and subor- 
dinates) and incorporated into formal performance appraisals. In such 
situations, peers and subordinates become an evaluative audience, and 
their presence is, therefore, likely to constrain performers’ feedback- 
seeking efforts. The findings also suggest that anything managers can do 
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to reduce the apparent evaluativeness of the context by institutionalizing 
opportunities for less public feedback exchanges should promote feed- 
back-seeking. The findings regarding the role of norms suggest that man- 
agers can promote feedback-seeking by instituting and communicating 
norms suggesting that most employees generally seek, for instance by 
encouraging subordinate opinion leaders to model feedback seeking. Such 
a strategy might be effective during initial socialization and training or in 
periods where employees’ needs for feedback are heightened such as 
during organizational transitions or downsizings. 
The findings also suggest that while norms provide important cues 
about appropriate levels of feedback-seeking, simply knowing that most 
people seek frequently will not “release” subjects from the perceived 
impression-management costs of public inquiry. Contrary to Hypothesis 
3, the impression-management costs of public seeking are quite strong. 
Even if “everyone is doing it,” individuals act as if feedback-seeking may 
reflect poorly on them individually. Thus, while norms regarding seeking 
had an important cueing effect (and therefore column means in Table 1 
differed), these cues did not eliminate audience effects or significantly 
reduce nervousness about seeking feedback or anxiousness about the 
task. Further, under the High Norm-Public-Evaluative condition, sub- 
jects sought less feedback than under the High Norm-Private or High 
Norm-Public-Nonevaluative conditions. These results suggest that (in 
contrast to Hypothesis 3), even under the High Norm conditions subjects 
are still responding to seeking context conditions that raise impression- 
management concerns. Thus, while norms regarding seeking are impor- 
tant, they do not eliminate impression-management concerns. Managers 
may need to recognize employees’ reluctance to seek feedback and pro- 
vide more extensive feedback in order to get this information to employ- 
ees. 
Finally, this study found no evidence that publicly self-conscious indi- 
viduals are more reactive to the apparent impression-management costs 
of public feedback-seeking. The public context in this study may have 
been strong enough to minimize the impact of individual-difference ef- 
fects. 
In sum, this study found some support for the psychological dynamics 
hypothesized by Ashford and Cummings (1983). Future research needs to 
test some of the organizational context variables that might interact with 
these processes. For example, it may be that a strong, performance- 
contingent reward structure will override individual’s fears about the im- 
pression-management costs associated with feedback-seeking. In such 
situations the payoff from seeking feedback may be so high that most 
people will seek. Interestingly, our findings suggest that this behavior 
would become self-reinforcing through time-as more people seek, a 
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norm is created sanctioning high seeding, making subsequent seeking less 
costly. 
Study 2 
Study 1 demonstrated that people act as if seeking feedback in public 
has impression-management costs, as Ashford and Cummings (1983) pro- 
posed. However, Schneider (1981) has argued that in order to generate 
actions that effectively manage impressions and reduce impression- 
management costs, individuals must be able to infer how others will see 
their behavior. Thus, “the skilled impression manager must not only be a 
skilled actor but she [sic] must have some sophisticated knowledge of 
how various behaviors are likely to be interpreted by the average per- 
ceiver and how a particular target will do the job” (Schneider, 1981, p. 
29). It is not clear that individuals can capably draw such inferences. The 
results of Study 1 demonstrate that actors believe that feedback-seeking 
has impression-management costs. This implies that, in turn, observers’ 
impressions of people should be influenced by whether those people do or 
do not seek feedback. Study 2 tests this general proposition along with 
three hypotheses derived from an attribution theory framework regarding 
the relative impression-management costs of feedback-seeking for vari- 
ous types of individuals. In effect, Study 2 addresses the question: If 
actors feel that their feedback-seeking will be interpreted negatively, do 
they in turn negatively interpret feedback-seeking by others? From a 
practical standpoint, if individuals are inaccurately assessing the impres- 
sion-management costs of seeking feedback, then they could be need- 
lessly reducing the amount of this valuable information that they seek. 
As Schneider (1981, p. 32) points out, we know next to nothing about 
the way a given bit of behavior (e.g., a feedback-seeking attempt) gets 
interpreted. For clues, though, observers are thought to take into account 
discounting cues (Kelley, 1973) in determining the extent to which an 
action (e.g., feedback-seeking) signifies something about the individual 
engaging in it. Discounting cues reduce the diagnostic value of a behavior 
(Kelley, 1973). Study 1, for instance, hypothesized that actors believe 
that a “frequent-seeking” norm would act as a discounting cue for ob- 
servers-that it would reduce the extent to which observers will infer 
anything about a seeker’s insecurity from his or her feedback-seeking. 
Given Ashford and Cummings’ (1983) proposal that seeking carries im- 
pression-management costs, any operative discounting cue should reduce 
these costs. 
Study 2 examines the effect of three potential discounting cues on 
observers’ impressions of feedback-seekers: the seeker’s tenure, role, 
and performance history. Specifically, new employees may be exempt 
from the need to maintain a totally self-assured image. Even if feedback- 
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seeking exposes uncertainty, the diagnostic value of that uncertainty for 
inferring anything about a new employee will be discounted by those 
observing the seeking attempt because most new people are expected to 
be uncertain. Consistent with this proposition, both Ashford (1986) and 
Feldman and Brett (1983) found that new employees sought more infor- 
mation and feedback than did those with longer tenure. Thus observers 
should be more likely to infer an underlying insecurity from frequent 
feedback-seeking when the feedback seeker is a more senior employee 
than when he or she is new. This logic suggests: 
H,: Senior employees will be perceived less favorably for seeking feedback than 
will those with less organizational tenure. 
In order to understand and predict the world around them, individuals 
also are thought to develop prototypes or images regarding the behaviors 
of individuals occupying certain roles (Staw, 1975). Thus, supervisors 
expect their subordinates to act deferential, their peers collegial, and their 
superiors leader-like. Observed actions that are inconsistent with these 
role prototypes are thought to be particularly distinctive and, therefore, 
especially diagnostic of the role incumbent’s true nature (Jones, Davis, & 
Gergen, 1961; Katz & Bernstein, 1975). Thus if a subordinate is particu- 
larly undeferential, this would be seen to be particularly diagnostic of that 
subordinate’s underlying character. If feedback-seeking is (as seekers 
seem to fear) a sign of weakness, then such seeking is more consistent 
with some roles than others. For roles in which admitting weakness and 
uncertainty is inconsistent, feedback-seeking becomes more diagnostic of 
the role incumbent and, therefore, the impression-management costs of 
feedback search increase. Since leaders need to portray a strong, confi- 
dent image (Staw & Ross, 1987), feedback-seeking seems most inconsis- 
tent with the supervisor role. Any seeking on the part of a leader or 
supervisor would be seen as diagnostic of that supervisor’s underlying 
character. Observers might draw negative inferences regarding the super- 
visor in this case. When subordinates seek, however, the situation is 
reversed. Asking for information and soliciting help is congruent with the 
role of subordinate. Therefore, a particular subordinate’s seeking is not 
likely to be seen as diagnostic of that subordinate’s underlying character. 
Thus while supervisors can exact more costs (e.g., withhold rewards) 
should they draw a negative impression of a seeker, given that seeking is 
congruent with the subordinate role, they are less likely to make such an 
inference. Asking a peer of co-worker for feedback would seem to fall 
somewhere in between-more role-congruent than asking a subordinate, 
but not quite as role-congruent as asking a superior. Therefore, the status 
of the seeker relative to the person from whom the feedback is sought will 
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also influence the impression-management costs paid by the seeker. 
Thus: 
H,: Individuals will be perceived less favorably when seeking feedback from their 
subordinates than from their co-workers and less favorably when seeking feedback 
from their co-workers than their supervisors. 
Finally, in ascribing characteristics to individuals, observers often at- 
tend to a few salient cues and then interpret subsequent information in a 
manner consistent with those cues (Staw, 1975). For organizational ac- 
tors, one salient cue is past performance. For example, when told how a 
group performed, observers interpret information about the group’s pro- 
cess and leadership in a way consistent with the performance outcome 
(Staw, 1975). Thus, high performing groups are perceived to have a more 
effective group process. This bias also may affect impressions of feed- 
back-seekers. Individuals who are known as superior performers may 
suffer less impression-management costs for seeking feedback than will 
seekers who are known as only average performers. Observers may use 
their knowledge of the seeker’s performance reputation to differentially 
interpret the seeking act due to the bias mentioned above. For superior 
performers, seeking may be seen as a sign of self-confident openness, 
while for only average performers that same act might be interpreted as a 
sign of insecurity. In effect, knowledge of past performance should bias 
interpretation of the seeking act. As a result, seeking is less costly for 
superior performers. Thus, 
H,: Individuals with a history of superior performance will be perceived more 
favorably than will individuals with a history of only average performance. 
Method 
Subjects. Subjects were recruited via a mass mailing to the managers in 
a small northeastern college. The mailing was restricted to nonacademic 
staff, all with some supervisory responsibilities. Altogether 480 mailings 
were sent and 3 12 were returned, for a total response rate of 65%. The 
sample was 54.7% female. The mean age of the sample was 39.6 years and 
the subjects had a mean of 15.6 years of full-time work experience and 5.9 
years on their current jobs. 
Experimental materials. The mailing consisted of a cover sheet, a one- 
paragraph vignette, and two pages of questions. The cover sheet de- 
scribed the study as being about perceptions of workers and impression 
formation in organizations. Subjects returning completed questionnaires 
were offered the opportunity to win (via a random drawing) one of two 
$50 gift certificates to the restaurant of their choice. Questionnaires were 
completed anonymously; a separate card was enclosed for the prize draw- 
ing. Completed questionnaires were returned via campus mail. 
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The data collection methodology followed closely that used by Fedor, 
Eder, and Buckley (1989). Subjects were presented with a very brief 
vignette and asked to imagine that the situation described was actually 
occurring in their own work setting. The vignette asked the subject to 
assume the role of a manager in a large northeastern organization and 
assume that he or she is approached by another worker (Bob) concerning 
a meeting both were involved in the day before in which Bob had made a 
presentation. The vignettes were varied across subjects on four dimen- 
sions: the seeker’s (Bob’s) role, job tenure, performance history, and 
purpose (e.g., to seek feedback or seek information). These dimensions 
provided the independent variables for the study. 
“Role ” referred to Bob’s position in the organization. Bob was de- 
scribed as the subject’s subordinate, co-worker, or immediate supervisor. 
“Job tenure” referred to Bob’s tenure in the company. Bob was de- 
scribed as being new to the company, or having been in the company for 
several years. “Performance history” referred to Bob’s past performance 
in the company, which was either “superior” or “only average.” Finally, 
“purpose” referred to Bob’s reason for approaching the manager. There 
were two conditions: Bob was either requesting feedback on his perfor- 
mance in the previous day’s meeting or asking for a copy of an article 
concerning his project. Thus, the overall design for this study was a fully 
crossed 3 (role: superior, co-worker, subordinate) by 2 (tenure: new or 
veteran) by 2 (performance: superior or only average) by 2 (purpose: 
feedback or article request) factorial design. 
The follow-up questions assessed the subject’s reactions to Bob. First, 
subjects were asked to rate the ease with which they could imagine the 
scene described in the vignette occurring in their own work setting. Fedor 
et al. (1989) argued that this measure ought to be included in all research 
studies using scenarios. It is important to determine if respondents view 
the situation as plausible, akin to something that could occur in their work 
setting. Second, subjects were asked to rate Bob on five personal char- 
acteristics: likability, conscientiousness, proactivity/reactivity, confi- 
dence, and insecurity. These items were included to represent both pos- 
sible positive and negative interpretations of the seeking act. Finally, 
subjects were asked for their assessments of Bob’s ability to perform in 
his current job and of his advancement potential. 
Results 
The focus of Study 2 was the effect of feedback-seeking on observer 
impression-formation. Therefore, only the effects of feedback-seeking 
alone or in interactions with the other three independent variables (job 
tenure, performance history, and role) are relevant to the experimental 
hypotheses. A MANOVA was performed assessing the effects of the four 
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independent variables alone and in combination across the dependent 
measures. Two dependent measures were computed from subjects’ re- 
sponses to the dependent measures. First, four personal characteristic 
items were highly intercorrelated (mean r = .63) and were combined to 
form a Personal Characteristic measure (alpha = 0.87). One of the five 
personal characteristics items (conscientiousness) was not highly corre- 
lated with the other personal characteristic items and was dropped from 
the analysis. Second, the performance-potential and advancement- 
potential items were combined to form a Performance Potential measure 
(alpha = .83). 
Subjects found the vignettes easy to imagine. The mean ease-of- 
imaging rating was 4.0 on a five-point scale. Subjects’ ease of imagining 
the situation described in the vignette proved to be significantly or mar- 
ginally significantly related to several of the independent variables (e.g., 
seek x performance, F = 3.14, p < .lO; seek x role, F = 3.44, p < .05; 
role x tenure, F = 6.8, p < .Ol; and performance X role x tenure, F = 
2.5, p < .lO). Therefore, following Fedor ef al. (1989), ease of imagining 
the situation described in the vignette was entered into each MANOVA as 
a covariate. The MANOVA results are presented in Table 4. 
Feedback-seeking, performance history, and job tenure all demon- 
strated significant multivariate main effects across the two dependent 
measures (multivariate Fs of 5.13, 151.48, and 6.81, respectively; ps < 
.Ol). Performance history demonstrated the strongest multivariate effect, 
with significant univariate main effects on both dependent measures (Fs 
> 144.37, ps < .OOl); those with a history of superior performance were 
perceived more favorably than were those with an only average perfor- 
mance history. Feedback-seeking demonstrated significant univariate 
main effects on the Performance Potential measure only (F = 10.29, p < 
.Ol); feedback-seekers were perceived more favorably than those who 
didn’t seek feedback. (However, note the significant interaction between 
feedback-seeking and performance history discussed below.) Job tenure 
demonstrated significant univariate main effects only on the performance/ 
potential measure (F = 9.09, p < .Ol); new workers were seen as having 
more ability and potential. No significant main effects were found for 
role. 
There were no significant two-way multivariate interactions for tenure 
or role and feedback-seeking. These results disconfirm Hypotheses 1 and 
2. In support of Hypothesis 3, there was a significant multivariate inter- 
action between feedback-seeking and performance history (F = 4.97, p < 
.Ol) that was reflected in significant univariate interactions for both de- 
pendent measures (Fs > 6.08, ps < .05). As shown in Table 5, feedback- 
seeking in general improved impressions of superior performers’ personal 
characteristics and performance/potential, but did not help (and some- 
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TABLE 4 
SIGNIFICANCETESTS OF INDEPENDENTVARIABLE EFFECTS ON PERSONAL 
CHARACTERISTICSANDPERFORMANCEPOTENTIAL 
Multivariate F 
F-personal F-performance 
characteristics potential 
Main effects 
Feedback-seeking 
Performance history 
Job tenure 
Role 
Interactions 
H,-feedback-seeking by 
tenure 
Hz-feedback-seeking by 
role 
H,-feedback-seeking by 
performance history 
Performance history 
by tenure 
Performance history 
by role 
Tenure by role 
Higher-order 
interactions 
*p < .05. 
** p < .Ol. 
*** p < ,001. 
5.13** 3.43 10.29*** 
151.48*** 144.37*** 295.48*** 
6.81** .Ol 9.09** 
.54 .89 .56 
.09 
2.08 3.00 2.55 
4.97** 6.08* 9.08** 
2.60 .71 1.66 
.lO .09 .19 
3.23* .09 5.04** 
C2.64 ~2.50 <l.O 
.03 .17 
what damaged) impressions of average performers. A significant multi- 
variate interaction also was found for role and job tenure (F = 3.23, p < 
.05), reflected in a significant univariate interaction only for the perfor- 
mance potential measure (F = 5.04, p < .Ol); Supervisors received lower 
performance/potential ratings (6.78 compared to 6.87 for peers and 6.98 
for subordinates), particularly if they were new to their jobs (x = 6.69 for 
new supervisors and 6.87 for longer-tenured supervisors). There were no 
other significant two-way or higher-order (three- or four-way) interac- 
tions . 
In sum these results, which captured the viewpoint of an observer of 
the seeking act, directly contradicted the general proposition derived 
from Ashford and Cummings’ (1983) theoretical work and supported by 
Study 1, that feedback-seeking conveys a negative impression. The re- 
sults also provide little support for Hypotheses 1 and 2: apparently being 
new or in a particular role are not relevant as discounting cues given the 
overall positive impression conveyed by feedback-seeking. Hypothesis 3, 
however, was supported. Observers reacted differently to feedback- 
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TABLE 5 
CELL MEANS (STANDARD DEVIATIONS) FOR THE 
FEEDBACK-SEEKING-BY-PERFORMANCE-HISTORY INTERACTION 
-. 
Did not seek Sought 
feedback feedback 
Personal characteristics 
Performance history 
Superior 5.24 5.71 
(1.13) c.92) 
Only average 4.28 4.16 
(1.05) C.76) 
Column mean 4.71 4.90 
(1.19) (1.14) 
Performance potential 
Performance history 
Superior 3.80 4.18 
C.68) (.50) 
Only average 2.96 2.93 
(36) (36) 
Column mean 3.33 3.53 
C.74) (31) 
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Row mean 
5.50 
(1.04 
4.22 
C.91) 
4.01 
C.61) 
2.94 
C.55) 
seeking when it was portrayed as coming from a superior performer ver- 
sus an only average one. 
Discussion 
The results of Study 2 address three important issues and raise new 
questions regarding the impression management costs of feedback- 
seeking. First, does an individual’s feedback-seeking behavior influence 
the impressions people form of that individual? The answer seems to be 
yes. In this study, subjects’ assessments of the performance and advance- 
ment potential of a character in a vignette (Bob) differed depending on 
whether the character sought feedback or not. Apparently, feedback- 
seeking is a behavior observers use in forming impressions of others. 
Second, what kinds of impressions do people form of feedback-seekers? 
Feedback-seeking, when the character in the vignette was a superior 
performer, was associated with more favorable impressions (i.e., more 
favorable personal characteristics) and higher performance potential judg- 
ments. Feedback-seeking did not enhance the impressions of poor per- 
formers. As suggested by Hypothesis 3, the feedback-seeking act appar- 
ently is interpreted differently (in particular, more positively) when per- 
formed by a superior versus an average performer. 
Finally, do the impression management costs of feedback-seeking 
found in Study 2 justify the impression-management concerns found in 
330 ASHFORD AND NORTHCRAFT 
Study l? Overall, feedback-seeking enhances observers’ impressions of 
superior performers. When combined with the results of Study 1, these 
results suggest some actors-specifically superior performers-are not 
particularly accurate at predicting how their feedback-seeking will be 
construed by others. They act as if feedback-seeking conveys a negative 
message (i.e., they seek less when audiences are present) though observ- 
ers may construe it positively. Thus, superior performers who attempt to 
protect their reputations by foregoing opportunities to seek feedback may 
be committing a “fundamental feedback error”-they think that seeking 
makes them look bad in the eyes of others when, in fact, it does not. 
These nonseeking superior performers pass up two valuable opportunities 
to enhance their organizational images. First, they do not receive the 
direct impression-enhancement effects of feedback-seeking. Second, if 
we believe the literatures’ typical finding of a link between feedback and 
performance (cf. Kopelman, 1986) these nonseekers also pass up the 
benefits of improved performance through feedback. 
This interaction between performance history and feedback-seeking 
was true whether the seeker was portrayed as the respondent’s superior, 
subordinate, or peer. These results suggest that more theoretical and 
empirical guidance is needed regarding which sources individuals use (or 
should use) to obtain feedback and regarding the impressions that seekers 
in different roles convey. The current research suggests that if you are a 
superior performer, you ought to feel free to seek from your boss, your 
peers, or your subordinates equally. However, if performers operate on 
role congruency notions (i.e., if they believe that showing any uncertainty 
via seeking feedback is not consistent with the supervisor role) they might 
be particularly reluctant to seek from subordinates. 
A note of caution should be sounded here in deference to the “rich- 
get-richer” interaction found between feedback-seeking and performance 
history. The methodology employed assesses only people’s ideas about 
how they would evaluate a hypothetical feedback-seeker. This leaves the 
methodology open to two critiques. First, respondents may have been 
responding in a socially desirable manner, though the vignette gives few 
cues regarding the correct or appropriate response. Second, this method- 
ology assesses respondents’ beliefs about how they would respond to the 
feedback seeker. How they might actually respond is unknown (particu- 
larly if active feedback-seeking is currently a rare occurrence in the work 
settings) and will likely also depend on a variety of contextual variables 
beyond those measured here. However, Far-r, Schwartz, Quinn, and Bitt- 
ner (1989) also found positive effects of feedback-seeking on subjects 
taking the role of supervisors and observing the actual seeking of a “sub- 
ordinate.” Frequent feedback-seeking subordinates were judged to be 
more concerned and interested than were infrequent seekers. The simi- 
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larity of these findings suggests that the limitations of the scenario meth- 
odology used here, while real, are not fatal. 
As an early attempt to empirically document some of the consequences 
of feedback-seeking (rather than its antecedents), this research suggests 
that feedback-seeking offers impression-management benefits rather than 
costs for seekers, and the image-enhancement benefits of feedback- 
seeking are most available to superior performers. The picture is more 
complicated for lesser performers. In one sense they appear to be damned 
it they do and damned if they do not-perceived relatively more nega- 
tively if they seek feedback and having to work without it if they do not. 
However, this logic only recognizes the instrumental/informational value 
of feedback. Feedback, particularly the negative feedback that poor per- 
formers might obtain, also affects self-esteem and feelings of self-efficacy 
(cf. Podsakoff & Fahr, 1989). Thus nonseeking poor performers may lose 
out in terms of not having the feedback they need to improve; such a 
strategy may be essential, however, for maintaining a necessary level of 
self-efficacy to allow some level of persistence at their tasks. Future 
research might profitably examine the boundary conditions of these ef- 
fects. For example, does feedback-seeking convey as positive an impres- 
sion the second time it occurs as it does the first? What about the fifth 
time or the tenth? Does the context affect impressions such that certain 
organizational realities may reduce the positive signal value of seeking 
while a high degree of environmental uncertainty (e.g., during an organi- 
zational transition) might enhance it? Finally, the availability and the 
clarity of task feedback might influence interpretations of the seeking act. 
If people seek feedback when both they and the observer can see that 
very clear task feedback is available, the seeking act may be seen as a sign 
of extreme weakness (if the task feedback is negative) or ingratiation 
(e.g., inappropriately fishing for compliments) if the task feedback is pos- 
itive. 
From a practical standpoint, these findings add some urgency to the 
recommendations advanced in reaction to the findings of Study 1. Man- 
agers need to design work contexts that decrease the apparent impres- 
sion-management costs of seeking feedback. Finding ways to enable feed- 
back-seeking by poorer performers is especially important because stud- 
ies have shown that individuals are often reluctant to give negative 
feedback (Tesser & Rosen, 1975) and that poor performers often receive 
distorted feedback (Fisher, 1979; Ilgen & Knowlton, 1980). Poor perform- 
ers need to feel free to seek feedback, unencumbered by impression- 
management concerns, lest their reluctance doom them to a downward 
spiral of less information, less performance, and a lesser organizational 
reputation. 
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APPENDIX 
Sample Vignette’ 
Today is a day like any other. You work for a large northeastern orga- 
nization. You have several immediate co-workers, you report to a single 
superior, and you have s small staff reporting to you. You are sitting 
comfortably at your desk working on final preparations for your year-end 
area review when you hear a knock on your offtce door. You look up to 
find Bob, your immediate superior, standing in the doorway. Bob is new 
to his job, and has had a history of superior performance. You and Bob 
were involved in an important staff meeting yesterday. The meeting was 
long and covered a variety of topics. One of the topics of the meeting was 
a project that Bob is working on. Bob gave a prepared presentation that 
lasted about 15 min, and then he spent about 5 min answering questions 
about the project. Bob asks if you are free for a few minutes. After the 
two of you exchange pleasantries, Bob asks you for some feedback about 
his presentation in the staff meeting you both attended yesterday. 
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